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Non-technical summary 
 
According to the European Court of Justice, any citizen or business who suffered harm as a 
result of a breach of the antitrust rules of the European Union (EU) should be able to obtain 
compensation from the party who caused the harm. Despite this clear and undisputed right of 
compensation, the current state of antitrust damage actions in the EU has frequently been 
classified as ‘ineffective’ regularly leaving the victims of antitrust infringements without any 
compensation for the harm suffered (see European Commission, 2011). 
Since 2004, the European Commission (EC) has taken a number of steps to develop a 
legal framework that allows victims of EU antitrust infringements to obtain compensation. In 
its Green Paper on damages actions for breach of antitrust rules, the EC (2005) concluded that 
the robust quantification of the caused damage is one of the key barriers to a further 
promotion of antitrust damage actions. Consequently, in the subsequent White Paper – 
published in 2008 – the EC announced the plan to derive a coherent economic framework 
which provides pragmatic, non-binding guidance on the quantification of harm. A first draft 
of this Guidance Paper was published in June 2011. 
 Although the public and academic discourse on the various methods and models to 
estimate damages certainly is a necessary step in the process of strengthening antitrust 
damages actions, the challenges of applying them in actual cases with real-world data are 
often ignored.  Against this background, we use a unique private data set of about 340,000 
invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study 
the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we 
investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the 
cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate 
the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data 
allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its 
regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and 
preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Gemäß der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) muss jedem 
Geschädigten ein Anspruch auf Ersatz des Schadens eingeräumt werden, der ihm durch einen 
Wettbewerbsverstoß entsteht. Trotz dieser klaren Vorgaben des EuGH wird das aktuell 
bestehende System der privatrechtlichen Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts oftmals als ineffektiv 
bezeichnet; unter anderem weil vielen geschädigten Parteien eine entsprechende 
Kompensation verwehrt bleibt (siehe Europäische Kommission, 2011).       
 Seit dem Jahr 2004 hat die Europäische Kommission eine Reihe von Schritten 
unternommen, einen rechtlichen Rahmen zu entwickeln, der es durch Wettbewerbsverstöße 
geschädigten Parteien erlaubt, eine entsprechende Kompensation zu erhalten. So 
veröffentlichte die Kommission beispielsweise im Jahr 2005 ein Grünbuch zur 
privatrechtlichen Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts, in dem sie insbesondere die vielfältigen 
Probleme einer Quantifizierung des entstehenden Schadens als eine große Hürde in der 
Umsetzung identifizierte. Im sich anschließenden Weißbuch, das im Jahre 2008 veröffentlicht 
wurde, kündigte die Kommission dann die Entwicklung von umfassenden, aber 
unverbindlichen Richtlinien zur Schadensermittlung an. Ein erster Entwurf dieser Richtlinien 
wurde im Juni 2011 publiziert. 
 Obwohl die aktuell stattfindende öffentliche wie wissenschaftliche Diskussion der 
verschiedenen Methoden und Modelle der Schadensermittlung ein wichtiger und notwendiger 
Schritt zur Stärkung der privatrechtlichen Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts ist, kommt die 
Würdigung der Herausforderungen einer praktischen Umsetzung der entsprechenden 
Methoden oftmals zu kurz. Vor diesem Hintergrund verwenden wir einen einmaligen 
Datensatz, bestehend aus ungefähr 340.000 Rechnungspositionen von 36 größeren und 
kleineren Kunden deutscher Zementproduzenten, zur Untersuchung des Wertes solcher 
Transaktionsdaten für die Abschätzung von Kartellschäden. Im Besonderen untersuchen wir 
zum einen, wie Strukturbruchanalysen bei der Identifikation des exakten Endes der 
Kartellabsprache helfen können. Zum anderen betrachten wir, wie eine Anwendung des 
zeitlichen Vergleichsmarktkonzepts zur Abschätzung der Kartellschadenshöhe von solch 
reichhaltigen Datensätzen profitieren kann. Wir stellen abschließend fest, dass 
Transaktionsdaten eine sehr viel detaillierte Untersuchung des Kartells und seines Einflusses 
auf die direkten Kunden erlauben, sodass sie regelmäßig in privatrechtlichen Verfahren zum 
Einsatz kommen sollten, solange die Datensammel- und -aufbereitungstätigkeiten nicht 
prohibitiv hohe Kosten verursachen.  
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1 Introduction  
According to the European Court of Justice, any citizen or business who suffered harm as a 
result of a breach of the antitrust rules of the European Union (EU) should be able to obtain 
compensation from the party who caused the harm.1 Despite this clear and undisputed right of 
compensation, the current state of antitrust damage actions in the EU has frequently been 
classified as ‘ineffective’, regularly leaving the victims of antitrust infringements without any 
compensation for the harm suffered (see generally European Commission, 2011). 
Since 2004, the European Commission (EC) has taken a number of steps to develop a 
legal framework that allows victims of EU antitrust infringements to obtain compensation. In 
its Green Paper on damages actions for breach of antitrust rules, the EC (2005) concluded that 
the robust quantification of the caused damage is one of the key barriers to a further 
promotion of antitrust damages actions. Consequently, in the subsequent White Paper – 
published in 2008 – the EC announced the plan to derive a coherent economic framework 
which provides pragmatic, non-binding guidance on the quantification of harm. A first draft 
of this Guidance Paper was published in June 2011.     
 Although the public and academic discourse on the various methods and models to 
estimate damages certainly is a necessary step in the process of strengthening antitrust 
damages actions, the challenges of applying them in actual cases with real-world data are 
often ignored.  Against this background, we use a unique private data set of about 340,000 
invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study 
the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we 
investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the 
cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate 
the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data 
allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its 
regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and 
preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive. 
 The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a general introduction into the 
identification and quantification of hardcore cartel damages and particularly discusses the 
importance of cartel length and cartel height. The subsequent Section 3 provides brief 
overviews of the German cement industry in general and the latest German cement cartel in 
                                                            
1  See Case C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 26; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 
Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619, paragraph 60. 
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particular. This industry knowledge is an important precondition for the presentation of our 
empirical analysis in the fourth section. Section 4.1 gives a brief introduction into the data set 
and presents the descriptive statistics. The subsequent section 4.2 applies structural break 
analysis to gain additional insights on the particular end of the cartel agreement, followed by 
the estimation of different models aiming at quantifying the price overcharge realized by the 
cement cartel. In Section 4.3, we rerun all regressions for the aggregated data set in order to 
check the robustness of our results. Section 4.4 provides a brief discussion of the major 
insights of our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper with a review of the key 
results and a discussion of future research avenues.  
2 The identification and quantification of hardcore cartel damages   
In the modern industrial organization literature, a hardcore cartel is typically defined as “… a 
group of firms who have agreed explicitly among themselves to coordinate their activities in 
order to raise market price – that is, they have entered into some form of price fixing 
agreement” (Pepall et al., 2001), p. 345). A perfectly functioning hardcore cartel – involving 
all firms in the market and referring to substitutive products – is expected to raise market 
price up to the monopoly level thereby harming overall and consumer welfare substantially. 
As hardcore cartels usually do not create any kind of benefits to society which could be 
traded-off against the anticompetitive effects, hardcore cartels are a prime example for a per 
se prohibition reflected in many antitrust legislations around the world.  
An answer to the subsequent question after the design of an antitrust enforcement system 
for anti-cartel rules must refer to two different strands: public enforcement and private 
enforcement. Public enforcement basically means that antitrust rules are enforced by state 
authorities. Through the imposition of a threat of civil, administrative or criminal sanctions 
for violations of the respective laws and regulations, policy makers aim to alter the cost-
benefit assessment for forms of anticompetitive behavior on the firm’s side sufficiently to 
make compliance to the dominant strategy.   
 By contrast, private enforcement is based on the actions of private parties – such as 
competitors, suppliers, customers or consumers – who can bring antitrust lawsuits based on 
the private damages caused by forms of anticompetitive behavior. Unlike the fines in public 
enforcement – which are imposed for reasons of deterrence and punishment – monetary 
payments in private enforcement are generally motivated by the pursuit of corrective justice 
through compensation (see Wils, 2009). However, although these private damages actions 
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aim at compensation, they typically also have a reinforcing effect on the deterrence of 
hardcore cartels. 
From an economic perspective, a system of private antitrust enforcement must be based 
on a sound theory of harm and must address particularly two issues: identifying damaged 
parties and determining the amount of damages. In the remainder of this paper, we 
concentrate on the damage of direct purchasers2 of a cartelized product and specifically 
investigate the key determinants of the final damage value and how transaction data can help 
to improve the respective estimations.  
In general, the damage caused by a hardcore cartel is a function of the demanded 
quantities of the cartelized product and the cartel-induced increase in price above the 
competitive level. As a consequence, any analyst aiming at estimating cartel damages has to 
come to robust conclusions on both the length of the cartel, i.e., the time frame over which the 
cartel was active and charged excessive prices, and the height of the cartel, i.e., the price 
overcharge achieved by the cartel members. The total damage estimate is then basically 
derived by multiplying cartel length with the cartel height. Figure l below sketches these two 
dimensions of cartel damages graphically.  
Cartel length
Time (months)
Price
Damage estimate
AA’ B B’
C
C’
D
 
Figure 1: Cartel length, cartel height and the estimation of damages 
Source: own graph 
In order to derive an estimate of the final damage, the determination of cartel length is the 
first compulsory dimension. For example, if the cartel agreement was referring to a product 
sold via medium- and long-term contracts, it is likely that the breakdown of the cartel did not 
                                                            
2  Other potentially damaged parties include indirect purchasers downstream, input suppliers upstream, non-
cartel members or suppliers of complementary products (and their downstream customers). 
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cause an immediate drop in market price to the competitive level. As a consequence, the 
correct cartel length in the sense of the correct period in which harm was caused, might be 
longer than B, e.g., B’ in Figure 1. The same general argument might apply vice versa for the 
time around the foundation of the cartel (A vs. A’ in Figure 1).    
 The second dimension of the final damage value is cartel height. As the excessive cartel 
price (marked D in Figure 1) can be observed easily, the key challenge for an analyst is the 
estimation of the but-for price, i.e., the price that would have existed absent the cartel (marked 
C in Figure 1). The difference between the cartel price and the but-for price determines the so-
called price overcharge. As sketched in Figure 1, the final damage value is reduced with 
increasing but-for prices (e.g., from C to C’ in Figure 1).  
2.1.1 Identification of cartel length  
The identification of the length of a cartel is a compulsory step in the estimation of cartel 
damages3 (see, e.g., van Dijk and Verboven, 2008; Davis and Garcés, 2010; ABA, 2010). 
Although most private damage cases are follow-on actions and are therefore able to use the 
cartel length determined in the public trial, different enforcement standards between public 
and private trials might suggest separate activities to identify the true cartel length. Moreover, 
the public trial considers overall welfare damage caused by the cartel. In contrast, damaged 
companies searching for compensation need not cover all damaged companies. Therefore, 
regional effects, long-term relations between the damaged and cartel firm or other influences 
might drive individual cartel damage claims. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
breakdown of a cartel agreement does not lead to an immediate drop of the market price to the 
competitive level but – for several reasons – is rather followed by a transition period from the 
cartel to the non-cartel state. First, even after cartel detection, forms of tacit collusion might 
still have some impact leading to a lagged price decline down to the competitive level. 
Second, in many upstream product markets, medium- and long-term contracts may lead to 
certain price persistence even after the cartel breakdown. Third, price rigidities can play a 
more general role, e.g., in the sense that cost changes are not reflected immediately in 
respective price changes.   
 The likely existence of a transition period from the cartel to the non-cartel period demands 
a consideration in the damage calculation. As the transition period is caused by the cartel 
agreement, the smaller but still elevated prices in the transition period must be included into 
                                                            
3  In this paper, we abstract from the problem that cartels might temporarily break down for reasons such as 
dispute among the cartel members or new market entry (but get reinstated afterwards). From an economic 
perspective, such ‘price war’ periods must be included into the total damage estimation. 
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the price overcharge estimation and the subsequent calculation of damages. If only aggregated 
public data is available, the actual transition process is difficult to identify and an econometric 
model has to consider simplified assumptions on the transition period.4  
 The availability of transaction data allows a much more detailed investigation of the 
transition period. An econometric tool which can help to identify individual cartel length is 
structural break analysis. This method formalizes the intuition that the beginning and the end 
of the cartel is reflected in breaks in the time series. One possibility to implement such an 
analysis is to define several dummy variables reflecting different assumptions on the cartel 
beginning and cartel end (see Davis and Garcés, 2010). As shown in Section 4 below, the 
availability of detailed transaction data increases the value of such analyses substantially.  
2.1.2 Identification of cartel height   
Cartel height, i.e., the difference between the excessive cartel price and the competitive ‘but-
for’ price, is the second key determinant of the final damage value. Economic research has 
developed several classifications of methods to estimate price overcharges (see, e.g., van Dijk 
und Verboven (2008), CEPS et al. (2007) and Oxera (2009)). For example, the seminal 
contribution by Oxera (2009) differentiates between three broad groups of methods: 
comparator-based, financial-performance-based, and market-structure-based. Comparator-
based approaches use external data to estimate the price overcharge by a) cross-sectional 
comparisons (comparing different geographic or product markets); b) time-series comparisons 
(analyzing prices before, during and/or after an infringement); and c) combining approaches 
a) and b) in a so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ model (e.g., analyzing the change in price 
for a cartelized market over time, and comparing this change against the change in price in a 
non-cartelized market over the same time period).  
Financial-analysis-based approaches use financial information on comparator firms and 
industries, benchmarks for rates of return, and cost information on defendants and claimants 
to estimate the counterfactual. Examples for techniques in this category are the examination 
of financial performance such as profitability or bottom-up costing of the cartelized product to 
derive the ‘but-for’ price.  
                                                            
4  For example, one possibility for the modeling of the price development in the transition period is to assume a 
linear price development by introducing an indicator variable with the value ‘1’ at the end of the cartel period 
and the value ‘0’ at the end of the transition period. Although indicator variables by definition have two 
specifications, a graduation can be implemented quite easily. A value of ‘1’ of the indicator variable basically 
means that the price at this particular point in time contains the full price overcharge of the cartel. If the 
indicator variable reaches a value of ‘0.5’ after the breakdown of the cartel, the respective price still contains 
half of the price overcharge of the cartel. 
6 
 
Market-structure-based approaches use a combination of theoretical models, assumptions 
and empirical estimations to derive a counterfactual estimate. Applying such an approach 
demands in a first step the identification of a theoretical model that fits best to the relevant 
market (e.g., a Cournot oligopoly model). Such a model should help in understanding how 
competition works in the respective market and how a reasonable ‘but-for’ price can look 
like. In a second step, the respective model can be calibrated using standard econometric 
techniques.    
The different methods to estimate ‘but-for’ prices differ significantly with respect to their 
input requirements, conceptual complexity, technical complexity and underlying assumptions. 
Given these differences and the diverse characteristics of real-world cartels, Oxera (2008) 
among others argues that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. To the contrary, it is not only 
necessary to identify the most suitable methods on a case-by-case basis, but it is also 
advisable to apply several methods in parallel in order to cross-check (or even pool) the 
results to arrive at a robust and reliable estimate of the ‘but-for’-price. E.g., in our empirical 
analysis below, data constraints only allow the application of a before-and-after approach.   
3 The cement market and the German cement cartel 
An important precondition for a robust econometric analysis of the damage caused by a 
hardcore cartel is a profound understanding of both the respective market in general and the 
cartel agreement in particular. Therefore, this section concentrates on, first, an overview of the 
key economic characteristics of the cement market, and second, a characterization of the latest 
German cement cartel.   
3.1 The cement market 
Cement can broadly be defined as a substance that sets and hardens independently, and can 
bind other materials together. Cement used in construction is largely so-called hydraulic 
cement that hardens when the anhydrous cement powder is mixed with water. Although 
cement is usually seen as a homogenous product, the current European standard EN 197-1 for 
common cements defines no less than 27 different cement types. However, a large fraction of 
the cement sales in most European countries refers to the so-called CEM I cement which 
contains only Portland cement clinker and no other possible constituents such as blast furnace 
slag, natural pozzolana, siliceous fly ash, burnt oil shale or limestone.  
 The cement production process can be subdivided into three main steps: the preparation of 
the raw mixture, the production of the clinker and the preparation of the cement. Cement 
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producers tend to locate near the most important raw material source (which typically is 
lime). The production of the clinker through heating in a cement kiln is not only quite 
inflexible (in the sense that the costs per unit increase quickly with a reduction in capacity 
utilization) but is also particularly energy-intensive (which is why cement producers have 
started to (partly) replace clinker by other constituents during the final step of the preparation 
of the cement). In general, production characteristics suggest that high start-up costs are 
incurred with entry into the cement market, e.g. due to the necessary access to lime resources 
or the installation of production plants and mills.  
 The most common use for Portland cement is in the production of concrete. Concrete is 
especially used in the construction industry either through the factory production of pre-cast 
units (such as panels, beams or road furniture), or through so-called ‘cast-in-place’ concrete 
needed for the construction of building superstructures, roads or dams. Given the seasonality 
of the construction business (with peaks in the summer months and a reduced activity in the 
winter months) cement demand follows comparable trends in most European countries.  
  In the sale of cement, transportation costs are a significant fraction of overall costs. This 
might suggest that the relevant geographical markets are more local. However, various 
decisions in cartel and merger cases (e. g. by the European Commission) confirmed that 
cement is also profitably delivered over longer distances. The Commission concluded in this 
respect that the “relevant market is therefore Europe, made up of an overlapping pattern of 
interdependent markets.”5 Given such interdependence, cartel agreements are often intended 
to allocate the overall market. As a consequence, a largely local pattern of deliveries cannot 
necessarily be attributed to economic constraints to long distance deliveries. 
 The general tendency of cartelization of cement markets can be explained by the presence 
of various factors that ease the implementation and stability of collusive agreements. For 
example, cement markets are typically characterized by a low number of cement producers, a 
relatively homogenous product, high market entry barriers and a rather inflexible production 
process. Interestingly, the assumed vulnerability for cartelization is not only supported by 
theoretical arguments but also reflected in the cartel enforcement record. In addition to the 
detected German cement cartel characterized in the following section, cement cartels have 
been identified and punished on the European level (e.g. European Commission, 1994)6 and 
                                                            
5  European Commission (1994), Commission imposes fines on a cement producers’ cartel, Press release on 30 
November 1994, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/94/1108&format= 
HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last accessed on 12 May 2012). 
6   See European Commission decision of Cembureau. 
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on the national level, such as in Norway, Sweden, France, Poland, India or the United States 
of America to name only a few.    
3.2 The German cement cartel  
In summer 2002, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) announced the alleged existence of 
a hardcore cartel in the German cement market. In the course of the investigation, it was 
found that a large number of German cement producers divided up the German market by a 
quota system at least since the early 1990s. Following its detailed investigation, the FCO 
found substantial supra-competitive proceeds due to elevated cement prices and imposed 
overall fines of about EUR 702 million with EUR 606 million referring to the six largest 
German cement producers Dyckerhoff AG, HeidelbergCement AG, Lafarge Zement GmbH, 
Readymix AG, Schwenk Zement KG und Holcim (Deutschland) AG.   
 The existence of the cartel was disclosed to the FCO under the German leniency program 
by the cartel member Readymix AG. The Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf confirmed the 
illegal cartel agreements in its decision of 26 June 2009, however, reduced the fine level to a 
sum of EUR 329 million due to partly insufficient data. Fines totaling EUR 70 million 
became effective prior to the decision of the Higher Regional Court, because some cartel 
members did not appeal the decisions relating to those fines. 
 The proved existence of the cartel suggests that customers paid elevated prices for cement 
and were therefore harmed substantially. This assumption is supported by the substantial drop 
in the public price index for cement shown in Figure 2.     
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Figure 2: The public price index for cement from January 1990 to December 2009 
Source: Own graph following Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 599 
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In addition to the general development of the public cement price index from January 1990 to 
December 2009, Figure 2 also marks key stages of the detection and prosecution of the 
cement cartel. The first indication of the cartel breakdown must be seen in the announcement 
of Readymix (in November 2001) to start replacing deliveries of other cartel members to its 
subsidiary concrete producers downstream with its own cement. The implementation of this 
announcement in February 2002 led to an increase in the (agreed) quotas for Readymix and 
was therefore interpreted as deviation from the agreement by the other cartel members. The 
official investigation of the alleged cement cartel started on 4 July 2002 with dawn raids by 
the FCO on the premises of 30 cement companies in Germany.7 
During the hearings before the Higher Regional Court, it was heavily discussed how the 
substantial drop in the price index after the disclosure of the cartel must be interpreted. 
Although a price drop as such is naturally expected after a cartel breakdown, it was argued by 
the defendants that the price drop was partly caused by a price war, i.e., the observed bottom 
price cannot be interpreted as the competitive level but a level below that. Eventually, the 
court identified the acquisition of cartel breaker Readymix by Cemex as crucial event for 
deriving the but-for price, partly, because the cement price index increased substantially in the 
aftermath of this event.8   
4 Empirical analysis  
In this section, we use private transaction data to investigate the ‘length’ and the ‘height’ of 
the German cement cartel. Section 4.1 gives a brief introduction into the data set and presents 
the descriptive statistics. The subsequent section 4.2 applies structural break analysis to gain 
additional insights on particularly the end of the cartel agreement, followed by the estimation 
of different models aiming at quantifying the price overcharge realized by the cement cartel. 
In Section 4.3, we rerun all regressions for the aggregated data set in order to check the 
robustness of our results. Section 4.4 provides a brief discussion of the major insights of our 
empirical analysis.     
4.1. Data set and descriptive statistics  
In our empirical analysis, we use invoice data collected by CDC Cartel Damage Claims based 
in Brussels. The raw data consists of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and 
                                                            
7  Source: Press release of the German Federal Cartel Office on 8 July 2002, ‘Searches conducted in companies 
in the cement sector’ available at www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2002/ 
2002_07 _08.php (last accessed on 12 May 2012). 
8  It is important to note that the decision of the Higher Regional Court refers to public enforcement only 
(following criminal law standards), i.e., its decisions are not binding for the ongoing private enforcement 
lawsuit (following civil law standards).  
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larger customers of German cement producers, both cartelist and non-cartelist.9 Market 
transactions include information on delivered quantities, gross prices, cancellations, rebates, 
early payment discounts or free-off charge deliveries. Based on this raw data, the private data 
set was constructed which includes detailed information on gross and net prices, quantities, 
providers, traders, cement type or places of deliveries. Technically, the transaction data used 
for our analysis is an unbalanced panel data set. The descriptive statistics for the entire data 
set is shown in Table 1.   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (entire data set) 
Variable  Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Deflated Price p Euro 74.81 15.04 1.30 231.20 
Deflated Price North  Euro 83.57 16.92 18.40 228.41 
Deflated Price South  Euro 80.22 14.52 14.79 178.71 
Deflated Price West  Euro 75.07 14.15 1.55 231.20 
Deflated Price East   Euro 66.81 11.91 1.30 210.51 
Deflated Price Strength 32.5  Euro 68.45 14.18 1.30 228.41 
Deflated Price Strength 42.5  Euro 77.28 14.00 1.55 231.20 
Deflated Price Strength 52.5  Euro 85.88 18.55 8.31 130.14 
Index of Production Precast 
Concrete Units (Detrended) Pcu   138.366 12.767 107.900 161.700 
Yearly Demand Yd  1000 t 91.564 96.831 0.084 368.644 
Share East Imports Eastimp   0.041 0.199 0 1 
Share Unloading Point North   0.073 0.260 0 1 
Share Unloading Point South South  0.314 0.464 0 1 
Share Unloading Point West West  0.310 0.463 0 1 
Share Unloading Point East East  0.303 0.459 0 1 
Share Strength 32.5 5.32F  0.322 0.467 0 1 
Share Strength 42.5 5.42F  0.635 0.481 0 1 
Share Strength 52.5   0.043 0.203 0 1 
Source: Own calculations based on transaction data  
Due to the key role of market price for our empirical analysis, we differentiate this variable 
further by market region and strength of CEM I cement.10 As revealed by Table 1, first, the 
regions North and South face on average higher prices than the regions West and East. 
Second, average prices increase with an increase in the strength of CEM I cement.  
Due to the fact that cement demand typically follows cyclical trends, we include the 
variable index of production precast concrete units into our analysis. The index is detrended 
so that it does not exhibit seasonal fluctuations. The inclusion of the variable yearly demand 
reflects cement demand on a customer-by-customer basis throughout an entire year. The 
                                                            
9  Please note that our empirical analysis only refers to (a large part of) the transactions of the 36 customers of 
cement companies that enter our data set. In sum, these quantities cover less than 10 percent of the entire 
German demand for cement. 
10  We concentrate on this type of cement for the remainder of the article. CEM I cement represents about 73 
percent of the entire cement demand in the data set. 
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analysis of the direct impact of the transaction-based demand on prices ignores that the 
respective invoice-related demand is constrained by the size of the means of transportation. 
Furthermore, alternative measures such as demanded quantity per unloading point or supplier 
face serious flaws.11  
The variable Share East Imports reflects the share of transactions which refer to imports 
of cement from Poland or the Czech Republic. Table 1 shows a small share of deliveries from 
both countries. We abstain from quantity-weighted measures due to the fact that most imports 
from these countries took place by rail (which is able to transport large quantities of cement at 
once).    
Complementary to the presentation of the descriptive statistics of the entire data set, a split 
of the entire data set into the cartel period and the consecutive non-cartel period can provide 
additional insights. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics under the assumption that the 
cartel period lasted from January 1992 (the beginning of our data set) to January 2002 (the 
last full month of the cartel agreement according to the public trial) and a consecutive non-
cartel period lasted from February 2002 to December 2003 (the end of the data set, not the 
non-cartel period). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11  With respect to the ‘demanded quantity per unloading point’ measure, the data base contains both 
transportation companies who deliver to different unloading points and companies who use cement as input 
good for the production of other goods such as paving stones or railroad ties. As a consequence, a 
differentiation by unloading point would underestimate the significance of transportation companies. 
Furthermore, no suitable approximation measures are available for the supplied quantity per unloading point. 
On the one hand, price should be explained by quantity. On the other hand, we can expect that – especially 
for transportation companies – price has an inverse impact on the ordered quantity per supplier leading to a 
simultaneity problem between price and quantity, i.e., a mutual influence between price and quantity on an 
unloading-point basis. The second alternative measure – demanded quantity per supplier – also faces serious 
flaws. For example, while the price might be reduced in the non-cartel period through rebates, the quantity 
cannot be corrected for, e.g., free-of-charge deliveries. 
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 Table 2: Descriptive statistics (divided into cartel and non-cartel periods) 
Variable Unit Cartel Period Non-Cartel Period 
Deflated Price Euro 76.42 57.47 
Deflated Price North Euro 85.05 59.48 
Deflated Price South Euro 82.03 64.85 
Deflated Price West Euro 76.86 56.04 
Deflated Price East  Euro 68.28 47.38 
Deflated Price Strength 32.5 Euro 70.11 50.01 
Deflated Price Strength 42.5 Euro 78.72 60.89 
Deflated Price Strength 52.5 Euro 90.76 60.69 
Index of production Precast Concrete 
Units (Detrended)  140.942 110.699 
Yearly Demand 1000 t 92.082 85.992 
Share East Imports   0.044 0.019 
Share Unloading Point North  0.075 0.049 
Share Unloading Point South  0.307 0.388 
Share Unloading Point West  0.310 0.313 
Share Unloading Point East   0.308 0.249 
Share Strength 32.5  0.323 0.313 
Share Strength 42.5  0.638 0.605 
Share Strength 52.5  0.040 0.082 
Source: Own calculations based on transaction data 
As shown in Table 2, all four unloading point regions show a substantial price decrease in the 
non-cartel period. Comparable results are found for the different strengths of CEM I cement, 
although the price decrease for a strength of 52.5 N/mm2 is the most significant. The index of 
production precast concrete units shows a downward trend of cement demand over time 
which can be explained by the general economic downturn in the observation period. With 
respect to the unloading points, the descriptive statistics show an adjustment from the regions 
North and East to the region South. However, this adjustment is not triggered by market-
related changes but can simply be explained by changes in the available data. The strength 
shares show an increase in demand for cement with higher strengths while especially the 
demand for medium-strength cement experienced a significant reduction.   
 The substantial value of the transaction data at hand can best be exemplified by briefly 
comparing it to publicly available data. For example, the estimations used in the public trial 
(see Section 3 above) were largely based on a time-series of a cement price index. The index 
is calculated on a monthly basis by the German Federal Statistical Office (FSO). Major 
German cement producers are provided with a standardized internet-based questionnaire and 
asked (on a voluntary basis) to provide overview information (including prices, quantities and 
qualities) on one representative CEM I sale activity close to the date of data collection (which 
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is the 15th of a month). As this data collection approach is highly standardized and used across 
a larger number of (cartelized and non-cartelized) firms, it offers possibilities for strategic 
behavior, e.g., with respect to the choice of the invoice handed over by the firms to the FSO. 
Furthermore, the FSO only collects gross price data for entire Germany and therefore does not 
allow any closer investigation of the role of gross-net price differences, geographical 
differences or variation in cement types.   
4.2. Empirical assessment of cartel length12 
In this section, we investigate how transaction data might help to gain additional insights on 
the length of the German cement cartel. Referring to the general discussion on the relevance 
of cartel length for robust damage estimation in Section 2.1.1 above, we conduct structural 
break analysis to particularly investigate the end of the cement cartel as reflected in invoice 
data.13  
 In general, structural break analysis provides statistical evidence for changes in data 
structure over time. While such an analysis is an adequate instrument for aggregated data, its 
usage becomes more difficult with individual data. By aggregating data, individual 
differences balance each other out, reduce volatility and, thus, provide a smoother index 
development. In contrast, individual data typically strongly depend on idiosyncratic 
influences with higher total volatility. Therefore, observed crucial changes result in a 
relatively weaker volatility compared to total volatility for individual data than for aggregated 
data. 
We use structural break analysis around the date of the cartel breakdown. While knowing 
the date of the actual end of the cartel – as defined by the beginning of the price decrease in 
February 2002 – the key question is whether and at which point in time customers 
experienced a significant change in prices due to the cartel breakdown.  
To investigate this issue, in a first step, we compare average prices and average variation 
coefficients 12 months before and 12 months after the period where the break is suspected 
(i.e., the official detection of the cartel by the Federal Cartel Office in February 2002). A 
significant change in prices takes place if the following t-value is significantly different from 
zero:  
 
( , )
c nc
c nc nc
t p p
se p p
 
 
(1) 
                                                            
12  This section largely follows the analysis in Hüschelrath and Veith (2011). 
13  Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to investigate the beginning of the cartel. 
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
cp  is the average price of the first period, ncp  is the average price of the second period and 
( , )c nc ncse p p  is the corresponding standard error of the price differences. Additionally, we use 
monthly variation coefficients instead of means to check whether volatility measures provide 
comparable results. Instead of variances or standard deviations, we use relative volatility 
measures, first, because levels differ between both sub-periods under scrutiny and, second, 
because prices differ across customer-provider trade relations. As prices in the non-cartel 
period are expected to be lower than prices in the cartel period, we also conduct one-sided t-
tests expecting t  to be significantly positive for prices. Descriptive statistics suggest volatility 
to increase after the cartel period. This is why we expect t  to be significantly negative for 
variation coefficients and consider also one-sided t-tests.  
 In a second step, we iteratively repeat the structural break analysis procedure six periods 
before and six periods after the end of the cartel to check whether transaction data suggests a 
different end of the cartel agreement. Figure 3 below shows the t-values for the period of the 
assumed structural break using public data and aggregated private price data and private 
monthly price variation coefficient data.  
 
Figure 3: t-values for varying break points 
Source: Hüschelrath and Veith (2011) 
As shown in Figure 3, the significance of public and private data moves to a far extent in the 
same direction. The further the period of the assumed structural break is shifted to the actual 
non-cartel period, the more significant the t-values become. While public data provide 
significant evidence for a structural break not before January 2002 (which coincides with the 
last month of the cartel period), aggregated private price data and also variation coefficients 
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on prices result in a significant structural break already in November 2001 (based on the 5-
percent level).14 This finding corresponds to the history of the cement cartel described in 
Section 3.2 above which found first signs of the cartel breakdown – caused by the deviation 
of a cartel member not the detection of the competition authority – towards the end of the year 
2001.15 The growing t-values over time reflect the increase in the deviation of non-cartel 
prices from cartel prices as more non-cartel prices enter the index after January 2002. As 
average prices are closer together for the 12-month period before July 2001 and the 12-month 
period after July 2001, the index is not significantly different from zero for the assumed 
breakpoint. However, the larger the share of lower prices that enter the index (and the larger 
the share of higher prices that drop out), the larger is the mean deviation around the end of the 
price maximum.   
 In a nutshell, aggregated transaction data provides an indication that some (large) 
customers of the cartelists experienced lower prices due to the end of the cartel agreement in 
November 2001 already. In addition to the aggregate use of transaction data conducted here, it 
is also possible to conduct such an analysis on an individual firm level, i.e., structural breaks 
are investigated on the level of individual customers. On the one hand, such an analysis might 
create additional value as contract terms might differ substantially between customers. On the 
other hand, it complicates analysis especially due to substantial variation in the purchasing 
patterns and purchasing quantities across customers (see Hüschelrath and Veith, 2011, for a 
detailed assessment in a cartel detection context). 
4.3. Empirical assessment of cartel height  
Following the empirical assessment of cartel length as one key determinant of the amount of 
damages, this section focuses on the second key determinant: cartel height, i.e., the size of the 
cartel overcharge. Based on the transaction data set described above, we develop and estimate 
two different models. While model 1 belongs to the group of so-called ‘pooled models’ and 
differentiates between level and log-linear specifications, model 2 makes full use of the panel 
data structure and estimates random-effects and fixed-effects models.  
                                                            
14  Please note that these dates mark the first period where a significant difference between 12-month-before and 
12-month-after prices is found. Thus, they are the earliest possible date for a change in the data structure but 
not the only date. 
15  It is important to remark at this point that the structural break analysis conducted here solely aims at gaining 
first indications on the possible existence of a cartel agreement. As a consequence, the results of the 
structural break analysis here might diverge from the results that should be used for a robust estimation of the 
cartel damages in court proceedings.   
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Due to data limitations, we will concentrate on the application of one particular 
comparator-based approach to estimate the price overcharge: the before-and-after approach. 
This method basically compares the price during the cartel period with the price in the same 
market before and/or after the cartel period. The ‘before-and-after’ approach has certain key 
advantages that explain its frequent application in overcharge estimations. First, data 
requirements are limited to time series of the respected cartelized product. Second, the 
economic concept behind the approach is quite straightforward thereby easing its application 
in court proceedings. Third, an estimation of the overcharge is technically relatively easy to 
implement and therefore suitable for implementation in a relatively short time window. 
Fourth, it is not necessary to make any assumptions on industry conduct absent the cartel.  
These various advantages of the method have to be traded off against several potential 
disadvantages or challenges. In general, the performance of the ‚before-and-after’ approach 
depends on the degree to which prices before/after the cartel provide a good approximation of 
the competitive prices in the long-run equilibrium. It is therefore crucial to closely investigate 
industry and market conditions before and after the cartel (see ABA, 2010). If the post-cartel 
period is chosen as comparator, overcharges might on the one hand be underestimated due to 
a possible continuation of (possibly tacit) collusion among the former cartel members (see, 
e.g., Harrington, 2004a, 2004b). On the other hand, an overestimation is possible if the former 
cartel members reduce prices below the competitive level, either to calm down angry 
customers (see Connor, 2008), or due to a price war that might follow the breakdown of the 
cartel (see de Coninck, 2010). 
4.3.1. Pooled models  
In general, the richness of transaction data allows a much more detailed analysis of specific 
aspects of the cement market and the cement cartel. For example, it is possible to control for 
differences between the four German sub-markets (North, South, West, East) and between 
different strengths of CEM I cement through the inclusion of dummy variables. In this 
section, we estimate the following equation by applying pooled models:  
32.5 42.5      32.5 42.5Sou
i C Pcu Yd i Eastimp
West East F Fh it
p Cartel Pcu Yd East
E
imp
South West Fst Fa
    
     
    
       (2) 
Equation (2) basically explains the deflated price ip  per transaction i  by a Cartel variable 
and several further right-hand side variables defined above. We follow the standard procedure 
in the econometrics literature and estimate two specifications of this model: in absolute terms 
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(model 1a) and in logarithms (model 1b). Given this general characterization of our model 
approach, Table 3 shows the estimation results.   
Table 3: Estimation of the price equation (models 1a and 1b) 
Dependent Variable Price Log(Price) 
 Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign. 
 (Std. error) Level (Std. error) level  
 (1a) (1b) 
Cartel Period 17.024 *** 0.325 *** 
 (2.468)  (0.059)  
Index of Production Precast  0.112 ** 0.001 ** 
Concrete Units (detrended) (0.050)  (0.001)  
Yearly demand (in ‘000/log.) -0.036 *** -0.050 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  
East Imports -0.442  -0.013  
 (2.397)  (0.033)  
Unloading Point South 1.572  0.025  
 (2.751)  (0.028)  
Unloading Point West -8.038 *** -0.098 *** 
 (2.530)  (0.030)  
Unloading Point East  -11.254 *** -0.140 *** 
 (2.379)  (0.027)  
Strength 32.5 -15.825 *** -0.170 *** 
 (2.583)  (0.056)  
Strength 42.5 -9.981 *** -0.087 * 
 (2.629)  (0.056)  
Constant 63.809 *** 4.518 *** 
 (5.309)  (0.122)  
Adj. R2 0.427 0.382 
F(9, 201) 62.71*** 87.14*** 
RMS error 11.392 0.190 
Number of observations 245,477 
                    Remarks: Significance level: *** 0 – <0.01, ** 0.01 – < 0.05, * 0.05 – < 0.1 
      Source: Own estimations based on transaction data 
Column (1) in Table 3 shows the estimation results for the level specification (model 1a) 
while column (2) reports the results for the log-linear specification (model 1b). An initial 
comparison of both sets of results reveals that both the coefficient of determination adj. R2 
and the F-test are quite similar for both specifications. This is not too surprising given the fact 
that the second specification only implements a linear transformation of selected variables.  
At first sight, the level of the adj. R2 seems relatively low for both specifications 
compared to the usual values observed in, e.g., time series analysis. However, it must be 
reminded that our analysis is based on individual transaction data which is expected to have 
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higher standard deviations than more aggregated data sets (for which the aggregation 
procedure takes away part of the idiosyncratic variation).  
Turning to an interpretation of the variables, the Cartel coefficient is highly significant in 
both regressions and leads to a price overcharge of 17.024 EUR/t for the level specification 
and of 21.077 EUR/t for the log-linear specification. Total market demand has a significantly 
positive influence on market price while a negative relationship is shown for individual firm 
demand. For example, following the results for model 1a, if a certain customer increases its 
yearly demand by 1,000 tons, the average price to be paid by this firm drops by on average 
3.6 Cents. In other words, customers with a large cement demand pay a lower price than 
customers with a small demand.        
As further shown in Table 3, the East Imports variable is insignificant in both 
specifications. Several explanations can be provided for this observation. First, parallel to the 
German cement cartel, a cement cartel in Poland existed (which lasted at least from 1998 to 
2009).16 Due to a large overlap of the cartel participants in both countries, a similar market 
conduct can be expected. Second, it is established that the Polish cartel implemented some 
kind of foreclosure strategy to hinder cement imports from Eastern European countries. The 
substantial investments of Germany-based cement producers in Eastern Europe together with 
a strategy to close down a significant fraction of production capacities are an indication for 
such objectives. Third, as the share of invoices relating to deliveries from Eastern Europe lies 
at only about 5 percent, it is possible that this share is simply too small to lead to a significant 
effect. Last but not least, the model specification must be considered as a fourth explanation 
for the observed results. Due to data limitations, we were forced to include East Imports as a 
dummy variable into the econometric model. As soon as further information on supply 
relationships or ownership interdependences become available, a more complete picture of the 
role of East imports could possibly be drawn.   
The unloading points have to be interpreted in relation to the region North. Focusing on 
the results of model 1a, while no statistically significant price difference can be found 
between North and South, the average prices for West and East are EUR 8.04 and EUR 11.25 
below the average value of the high-price regions. Finally, the results for the different 
strengths of CEM I cement have to be interpreted in relation to the strength class 52.5 N/mm2. 
                                                            
16  According to paragraph 512 of the decision of the Polish Competition Authority, the non-leniency applicants 
denied having taken part in the cement cartel in Poland. They did not present evidence proving that they had 
ceased the cartel arrangement at any time. The leniency applicants on the other hand admitted that they had 
ceased cartel activities at the latest at the date of the leniency application in June 2006. As a consequence of 
failing to provide evidence to the contrary, the Polish Competition Authority concluded in paragraph 513 of 
its decision issued on 9 December 2009 that the anticompetitive practice had not yet been terminated. 
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Again focusing on the results for model 1a, Table 3 reveals that CEM I cement of a strength 
of 32.5 N/mm2 / 42.5 N/mm2 is on average EUR 15.83 / EUR 9.98 cheaper than CEM I 
cement of a strength of 52.5 N/mm2. 
Comparing the results of the descriptive statistics with the first multivariate modeling 
results reveals several important observations. For example, when comparing the price 
differential between the cartel period and the non-cartel period, the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 show that the average deflated prices in the cartel period were EUR 76.42, while the 
non-cartel period showed average prices of EUR 57.47, leading to a price difference of EUR 
18.95. The results of the multivariate approach show – exemplary for model 1a – that the 
cartel price was on average EUR 17.02 higher than in the non-cartel period. The higher price 
difference for the descriptive approach can be explained by the fact that the multivariate 
approach includes further simultaneous impact factors on the average price for cement such 
as, e.g., price fluctuations in different regions. The multivariate approach is therefore expected 
to lead to more accurate results compared to simple descriptive statistics.  
Following the results shown in Table 3, the price in the cartel period was 0.325 higher 
than in the non-cartel period. In order to calculate the corresponding average price, the 
average of the logarithm of the non-cartel period prices must be determined (which is found 
to be 3.981). The average price in the cartel period can then be calculated as 
exp(3.981+0.325) = 74.14 EUR/t, leading to an absolute cartel overcharge of EUR 20.57. 
This significantly larger overcharge – compared to the other values found above – can be 
explained by taking the logarithm of the price variable and the consequential stronger left-
shift of larger values compared to smaller values explained above. This has a direct effect on 
the arithmetic mean. Furthermore, while the distribution of the absolute values in the data set 
is weakly left-skewed ( 0.242   ), taking the logarithm further increases the left-skewness 
of the distribution ( 10.839   ). This has a direct impact on the estimation results in the 
sense that the price during the non-cartel period is lower. As the distribution of the absolute 
price comes rather close to a normal distribution, the estimation approaches underlying model 
1a (based on absolute values) should be preferred over model 1b (based on logarithmic 
values).  
4.3.2. Static panel data models  
The previous econometric models ignored both the time component and the individual 
character of the variables. Static panel data approaches implicitly control for potential 
influences resulting from time or idiosyncratic drivers. In the following we apply the two 
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most prominent static methods – the random-effects approach and the fixed-effects approach 
– and compare the respective estimation results.    
 Technically, the key difference between the pooled model discussed in the previous section 
and the random-effects model is that the latter allows for changes of independent and 
dependent variables over time and the consideration of individual effects. Both changes are 
directly reflected in the estimation equation:    
32.5 42.5      32.5 42.5
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Equation (3) differs from Equation (2) in the following ways. The dependent variable itp  and 
the yearly demand variable itYd  now consider the time aspect. Although the constant   is 
again assumed identical for all estimations, time-independent individual deviations exist for 
every combination of unloading point and customer i . In this respect, it is important to 
remark that a random-effects estimation assumes a joint normal distribution across all 
potentially possible unloading point-customer combinations. The individual difference 
therefore has to be interpreted as an additional time-independent error term leading to a 
composite error of it i itu   . 
 The fixed-effects specification (Model 2b) differs only slightly from the random-effects 
estimation just discussed. The respective regression equation has the following form:  
32.5 42.5      32.5 42.5
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While the random-effects specification assumes a joint distribution across all potentially 
possible unloading point-customer combinations, the fixed-effects approach explicitly models 
individual differences with a separate constant term i  for every unloading point-customer 
combination. This extension therefore allows investigating price differences on an individual 
basis. The estimation results of both static panel data models are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Estimation of the price equation (models 2a and 2b) 
Estimation technique  Random Effects Fixed  Effects 
 Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign. 
 (Std. error) Level (Std. error) Level 
 (2a) (2b) 
Cartel Period  15.059 *** 15.062 *** 
 (0.096)  (0.096)  
Index of Production Precast  0.074 *** 0.074 *** 
Concrete Units (detrended) (0.002)  (0.002)  
Yearly Demand (absolute) -0.021 *** -0.021 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
East Imports  -0.657 *** -0.658 *** 
 (0.118)  (0.118)  
Strength 32.5 -7.328 *** -7.321 *** 
 (0.137)  (0.137)  
Strength 42.5 -3.341 *** -3.335 *** 
 (0.120)  (0.120)  
Constant  58.686 *** 57.130 *** 
 (1.004)  (0.271)  
R2 (within) 0.190 0.190 
R2 (between) 0.151 0.151 
R2 (overall) 0.277 0.277 
Wald Chi2 (6), F (6, 245,269) 57638.7*** 9599.3*** 
Number of observations 245,477 
             Remarks: Significance level: *** 0 – <0.01, ** 0.01 – < 0.05, * 0.05 – < 0.1 
             Source: Own estimations based on transaction data 
As revealed by Table 4, both specifications lead to very similar results. Compared to the 
pooled models, the unloading point is not explicitly included as the panel variable unloading 
point-customer already contains this information (and therefore considers it implicitly in the 
model). A comparison of the coefficients of the panel data estimations with the pooled 
estimations reveals a general downward shift of the coefficients in absolute terms taking the 
panel structure into account. With the pooled estimation approach, part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity is absorbed by other variables in the model. In consequence, the corresponding 
coefficients are larger in absolute terms in the pooled approach. In contrast, taking into 
account the time and the panel character, the wrongly dedicated ‘part of explanation’ is 
controlled by the variance clustering in the panel estimation approach which results in less 
deterred coefficients.  
Furthermore, given the observation that a large fraction of the customers buy only one or a 
small number of different cement types, it is likely that in the pooled model, part of the 
individual differences of the customers was absorbed by the respective control dummies. As 
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customer characteristics are explicitly controlled in a panel data approach, the impact of the 
strength variable on price is reduced. Finally, while it was not possible in the pooled model to 
determine the impact of East Imports on price, the more detailed panel data analysis allows a 
significant reduction of the model-inherent uncertainty leading to a significant coefficient. 
The availability of two slightly different panel data approaches finally suggests a reasoning 
which of the two approaches is more suitable for the case at hand. The Hausman-test 
investigates whether a panel data set follows a fixed-effects model or rather a random-effects 
model. As the test provides evidence for a systematic difference between the coefficients is 
existent (Chi2(6) = 32.65), the fixed-effects approach is the preferred choice. 
4.3.3. Estimation results based on aggregated transaction data   
In the previous section, we applied two different sets of models to the disaggregated 
transaction data set. Disaggregated data sets generally have the advantage of containing the 
most detailed information possible. However, their typically large size together with their 
substantial heterogeneity lead to strong idiosyncratic heterogeneity and, thus, more scattered 
distributions in contrast to aggregated data.. As a consequence, it might add value to the 
analysis to find a sensible way to aggregate the data set. Although some information is 
inevitably lost during such an aggregation procedure, the aggregation at the same time 
increases the general manageability of the data set and flattens potential outlier patterns.   
Following a couple of tests to assure a sufficient degree of representativeness, the original 
transaction data set was aggregated as follows. Concerning the key variables, the data set was 
stratified with respect to supplier, customer, unloading point and strength. This allows the 
derivation of information on market regions and imports from Eastern Europe. With respect to 
the time dimension, the data set was aggregated to a monthly basis. The aggregation 
procedure led to a reduction in the size of the data set to 16,200 observations (a reduction of 
about 93.4 percent). Again, the analysis focuses on CEM I cement and therefore ignores all 
other types of cement in the data set. The results for models 1 and 2 described above – now 
applied to the aggregated data set – are shown in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.  
As revealed by Table 6, the aggregation procedure led to a rather small improvement of 
the model fit as shown by the slightly elevated adj. R2 values. The model variables also show 
only small changes. The significant shift of the unloading points in the region West identified 
above led to a corresponding increase in the coefficient of the respective dummies. The 
aggregation of the price variables led to a slightly right-skewed distribution  
( 0.164  ). The distribution of the logarithm of the price variables is still left-skewed, 
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however, converges to the normal distribution ( 2.737   ). With respect to absolute 
changes, the estimation of the log-linear model (model 1d) led to an average price for the 
cartel period of exp(4.002+0.313) = EUR 74.81. The corresponding value of the estimation 
of the absolute values (model 1c) is found to be EUR 75.55. Again, it can be concluded that 
the analysis on the basis of logarithmic values led to a stronger deviation. The discussion of 
the remaining estimation results is omitted here as they differ only slightly from the results for 
the disaggregated data. 
Turning to the static panel data models, contrary to the results for the disaggregated data 
set, Table 7 shows that the coefficients between the pooled estimation and the panel data 
estimations differ less from each other. Nevertheless, the difference for the coefficient of the 
cartel dummy remains rather constant (as already observed for the disaggregated data set). 
With respect to the coefficient of the East Import dummy, the results show a further increase. 
Due to the strong weighting of the regions South and East in the data set and the significant 
differences in the respective shares, the panel data set led to a further increase in the 
explanatory power of this variable. For the same reason, the coefficient of the dummies for 
the different strengths increase compared to the pooled results. 
4.3.4. Discussion of the results   
Based on the various model estimations in the preceding two sections, this section provides a 
final comparison of the major results and a brief discussion of their implications. Although 
our empirical analysis produced a rich set of results, the overview table below concentrates on 
our major variable: the price overcharge of the cartel. 
Table 5: Overview table of the overcharge estimates 
No. Model 
Estimated 
overcharge in 
EUR/ton  
(2010 prices) 
Estimated 
overcharge in 
percent 
Disaggregate transaction data  
1a Level 17,024  
1b log-linear 21,077 32.5% 
2a random effects 15,059  
2b fixed effects 15,062  
Aggregate transaction data  
1c Level 17,389  
1d log-linear 20,198 31.3% 
2c random effects 15,638  
2d fixed effects 15,661  
Source: Own estimations based on transaction data 
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A comparison of the price overcharges based on disaggregated and aggregated data reveals 
that the stratification led to a slight increase – with the exception of the log-linear version of 
the pooled approach – but do not change results substantially. Extending such a comparison to 
the other variables confirms this general result as the use of aggregated data leads to 
comparable results with respect to both direction and strength of the respective coefficients. 
Given the fact that disaggregated data is often not available, our analysis of the data for the 
German cement cartel suggest that results would not differ much if more aggregated data is 
applied for the estimations. However, as soon as an aggregation procedure is applied, it is 
important to base it on objective criteria that do not favor the impact of specific variables.     
In a nutshell, the undertaken comparison of various multivariate models shows that they 
typically lead to slightly different results.17 In general, two main sources for this observation 
can be identified: the structure of the applied data set and the chosen estimation model. While 
the data set typically cannot be changed, the model choice remains the key driving factor of a 
robust and meaningful multivariate analysis. In order to show the robustness of the received 
results, it is a well established standard in economic research to apply different models. 
However, the analyst is still obliged to explain the potential relevance of the chosen models 
and the included variables in the specific context of the data set and the economic 
characteristics of the industry under investigation. 
Although our results are robust, it is important to point to several caveats of our analysis. 
First, our data set covers only a fraction of the entire German cement market. As reported 
above, the data represents a bit less than 10 percent of German cement demand. Second, 
customers included in the data base are not distributed evenly across Germany but show a 
concentration in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country. Third, our data set ends in 
December 2003. Referring to the description of the cartel case in Section 3 above, this period 
was characterized by the lowest market prices (according to public gross price data). 
Although results for private data could diverge, our analysis would certainly benefit from 
additional private data including a few more years after the breakdown of the cartel. Fourth, in 
direct relation to this, the public trial assumed a price war taking place after the breakdown of 
the cartel. Although no evidence was published which clearly suggests the existence of a price 
war, data limitations would foreclose any attempt to model the effect of such an alleged price 
war.     
                                                            
17  It is important to note here that even small increases in the overcharge can have substantial effects on the 
final damage amount. As our estimates refer to the price in EUR per ton, it is easy to show that an increase of 
a few cents can have a substantial impact for a customer who has regularly bought large quantities of cement. 
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Last but not least, given the general title of this paper, it is important to remark that the 
derivation of cartel length and cartel height is not the final stage of the estimation of damages. 
For example, before the respective volumes can be multiplied with the respective overcharge 
value, factors such as inflation, interest and possibly also compound interest must be 
considered and included into the calculation of the final damage value (see Hüschelrath et al. 
(2012) for an analysis within the German laws and regulations). Furthermore, our analysis in 
this paper focused on the estimation of damages for direct customers of the cartel. A full-
fledged analysis, however, would not only have to consider other potentially damaged parties 
in upstream or complementary markets, but would also have to discuss the relevance of a 
possible pass-on of cartel-induced price increases to subsequent stages downstream. We leave 
these important further aspects for future research. 
5 Conclusion    
The recent past has seen increased efforts by both academics and practitioners to investigate 
the pros and cons of various techniques to quantify the harm caused by antitrust 
infringements. While such general discussions of various methods and models are certainly 
useful for the promotion of private damages actions, they typically ignore the challenges of 
applying the respective tools to real-world cases and real-world data.  
 Against this background, we use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice 
positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the 
value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we 
investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the 
cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate 
the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets.  
 With respect to the first key dimension of cartel damage estimations – cartel length – 
structural break analysis applied to transaction data leads to similar results as publicly 
available price index data. However, our empirical results do provide an indication that some 
customers experienced a substantial price drop even before the breakdown of the cartel is 
reflected in publicly available data. Although it is not the focus of this paper, transaction data 
can in principle be used to conduct structural break analysis on an individual firm level and 
would therefore allow a much more detailed analysis of the individual damages of a customer 
under investigation.  
 Turning to the second key dimension of cartel damage estimations – cartel height (i.e., the 
price overcharge) – our comparison of various multivariate models shows that they typically 
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lead to slightly18 different results. In general, two main sources for this observation can be 
identified: the structure of the applied data set and the chosen estimation model. While the 
data set typically cannot be changed, the model choice remains the key driving factor of a 
robust and meaningful multivariate analysis. In order to show the robustness of the received 
results, it is a well established standard in economic research to apply different models. 
However, the analyst is still obliged to explain the potential relevance of the chosen models 
and the included variables in the specific context of the data set and the economic 
characteristics of the industry under investigation. 
 Given our empirical results, we can generally conclude that transaction data sets allow for 
a much more detailed analysis of the cartel than the simple reliance on – typically highly 
aggregated – publicly available data. Although collecting individual data requires a complex 
infrastructure, strong efforts by damaged customers and a significant effort in data 
preparation, the resulting data sets and analyses provide a much more detailed perspective on 
cartelists’ behavior and, thus, allow a much more precise calculation of damages. Admittedly, 
using transaction data has certain caveats, especially because it is typically available for a sub-
set of the damaged parties only. However, the richness of the data allows so many in-depth 
investigations of the economic effects of the cartel agreement that its regular application in 
private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not 
prohibitively expensive. Especially due to the new software-based accounting systems – 
which significantly reduce data-related costs – hopes are raised that an application of 
transaction data sets will soon become the rule rather than an exception in private damage 
cases and will therefore boost the relevance of private antitrust enforcement in the European 
Union onto a new level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18  It is important to note here that even small increases in the overcharge can have substantial effects on the 
final damage amount. As our estimates refer to the price in EUR per ton, it is easy to show that an increase of 
a few cents can have a substantial impact for a customer who has regularly bought large quantities of cement. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 6: Estimation of the price equation (models 1c and 1d; aggregated data set) 
Dependent Variable  Price Log (Price) 
 Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign. 
 (Std. error) Level (Std. error) Level 
 (1c) (1d) 
Cartel Period  17.389 *** 0.313 *** 
 (1.571)  (0.035)  
Index of Production Precast  0.095 *** 0.001 *** 
Concrete Units (detrended) (0.035)  (0.000)  
Yearly Demand (absolute/log.) -0.039 *** -0.043 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.008)  
East Imports -2.191  -0.031  
 (1.845)  (0.024)  
Unloading Point South 1.592  0.043  
 (2.163)  (0.036)  
Unloading Point West  -10.818 *** -0.110 *** 
 (2.360)  (0.041)  
Unloading Point East -11.182 *** -0.128 *** 
 (2.032)  (0.037)  
Strength 32.5 -16.357 *** -0.196 *** 
 (1.811)  (0.029)  
Strength 42.5 -11.625 *** -0.129 *** 
 (1.653)  (0.027)  
Constant  68.851 *** 4.504 *** 
 (4.643)  (0.097)  
Adj. R2 0.437 0.389 
F (9, 201) 69.17*** 108.04*** 
RMS error 12.447 0.203 
Number of observations 16,196 
              Remarks: Significance level: *** 0 – <0.01, ** 0.01 – < 0.05, * 0.05 – < 0.1 
                     Source: Own estimations based on private data 
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Table 7: Estimation of the price equation (models 2c and 2d; aggregated data set) 
Estimation technique Random Effects Fixed  Effects 
 Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign. 
 (Std. error) Level (Std. error) level 
 (2c) (2d) 
Cartel Period  15.638 *** 15.661 *** 
 (0.381)  (1.229)  
Index of Production Precast  0.109 *** 0.111 *** 
Concrete Units (detrended) (0.009)  (0.009)  
Yearly demand (absolute) -0.018 *** -0.015 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
East Imports -2.659 *** -2.679 *** 
 (0.501)  (0.501)  
Strength 32.5 -11.727 *** -11.669 *** 
 (0.470)  (0.471)  
Strength 42.5 -7.900 *** -7.832 *** 
 (0.442)  (0.442)  
Constant 57.429 *** 56.317 *** 
 (1.551)  (1.229)  
R2 (within) 0.250 0.250 
R2 (between) 0.125 0.115 
R2 (overall) 0.275 0.269 
Wald Chi2 (6), F(6, 15,988) 5377.4*** 890.3*** 
Number of observations 16,196 
Remarks: Significance level: *** 0 – <0.01, ** 0.01 – < 0.05, * 0.05 – < 0.1 
                    Source: Own estimations based on private data 
 
